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codeql-action/queries/binary-planting.ql
2024-12-19 14:21:06 +00:00

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/**
* @name Exec call vulnerable to binary planting
* @description On Windows, executing a binary with an unqualified name will execute a binary in the working directory in preference to a binary on PATH.
* @kind path-problem
* @problem.severity error
* @id javascript/codeql-action/binary-planting
*/
import javascript
import DataFlow
import DataFlow::PathGraph
class WhichBarrierGuardNode extends DataFlow::BarrierGuardNode, DataFlow::InvokeNode {
WhichBarrierGuardNode() { getCalleeName() = "which" }
override predicate blocks(boolean outcome, Expr e) {
outcome = true and
e = getArgument(0).asExpr()
}
}
class BinaryPlantingConfiguration extends DataFlow::Configuration {
BinaryPlantingConfiguration() {
this = "BinaryPlantingConfiguration"
}
override predicate isSource(Node node) {
node.asExpr() instanceof StringLiteral and
not node.asExpr().(StringLiteral).getValue().matches("%/%") and
not node.getFile().getBaseName().matches("%.test.ts")
}
override predicate isSink(Node node) {
node instanceof SystemCommandExecution or
exists(InvokeExpr e | e.getCalleeName() = "ToolRunner" and e.getArgument(0) = node.asExpr())
}
override predicate isBarrierGuard(DataFlow::BarrierGuardNode guard) {
guard instanceof WhichBarrierGuardNode
}
}
from BinaryPlantingConfiguration cfg, PathNode source, PathNode sink
where cfg.hasFlowPath(source, sink)
select source.getNode(), source, sink, "This exec call might be vulnerable to Windows binary planting vulnerabilities."